Educational assortative mating and economic inequality are likely to be endogenously determined, but very little research exists on their empirical association. Using census data and log-linear and log-multiplicative methods, I compare the patterns of educational assortative mating in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, and explore the association between marital sorting and earnings inequality across countries. The analysis fi nds substantial variation in the strength of specifi c barriers to educational intermarriage between countries, and a close association between these barriers and the earnings gaps across educational categories within countries. This fi nding suggests an isomorphism between assortative mating and economic inequality. Furthermore, educational marital sorting is remarkably symmetric across gender in spite of the different resources that men and women bring to the union. This study highlights the limitations of using single aggregate measures of spousal educational resemblance (such as the correlation coeffi cient between spouses' schooling) to capture variation in assortative mating and its relationship with socioeconomic inequality. To the extent that economic inequality is based on returns to education-a well-documented fact in contemporary societies-inequality may affect educational marital sorting by altering the individual preferences and incentives for intermarriage and the structural constraints that regulate it.
n a context of growing economic disparities, the contribution of assortative mating to inequality and its intergenerational reproduction has become a topic of concern. Studies have suggested that marital sorting contributes to income inequality across households (Burtless 1999; Schwartz 2010 ; but see Breen and Salazar 2009) and to the intergenerational economic persistence (Chadwick and Solon 2002; Ermish, Francesconi, and Siedler 2006) . Furthermore, theoretical models suggest that spousal educational resemblance may strengthen the intergenerational reproduction of advantage by increasing the disparities in the home environments experienced by children (Fernandez and Rogerson 2001; Kremer 1997; Mare 2000) . However, very little research exists on the empirical association between marital sorting and economic inequality. The main objective of this article is to explore this association by comparing earnings gaps and patterns of intermarriage between educational groups in three Latin American countries: Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.
In this article, I address two questions: To what extent are the marriage barriers between educational groups accounted for by earnings differences between these groups? And, to what extent are cross-country differences in the strength of barriers to educational intermarriage accounted for by international variation in earnings inequality? This article departs from previous studies in two respects. First, instead of producing a single measure of marital sorting (such as the correlation of spouses' schooling) and of inequality (such as the Gini coeffi cient), I examine barriers to intermarriage and earnings gaps between specifi c educational categories. To the extent that there is substantial international variation in these barriers (and there is), this strategy provides an accurate test of the association between educational marital sorting and economic inequality. Second, instead of measuring inequality contemporaneously-many years after unions have been formed for a large proportion of the population-I devise a measure of life-cycle earnings of potential spouses with different levels of schooling at the (approximate) time of marriage, an assessment that more adequately captures the constraints and choices faced by individuals at risk of entering into a union. 1984). Chances of intermarriage also depend on the degree of spatial and institutional segregation by education. Persons with similar levels of schooling might tend to concentrate in neighborhoods and in institutions such as schools, workplaces, and churches (Blossfeld and Timm 2003; Kalmijn and Flap 2001; Mare 1991) . Even though a causal infl uence of economic inequality on segregation is diffi cult to ascertain, theoretical models and empirical analysis suggest that wider economic disparities induce segregation (Bjorvatn and Cappelen 2003; Lobmayer and Wilkinson 2002; Massey 1996) . Segregation will, in turn, lower the chances that individuals will encounter potential partners with different levels of schooling, increasing educational homogamy.
In sum, these theoretical perspectives suggest that educational assortative mating should be higher in more unequal contexts. Economic disparities will have a direct infl uence on marital sorting by lowering the economic incentives for intermarriage and by heightening the cultural barriers among individuals with different levels of schooling. It should also have an indirect infl uence by inducing segregation in marriage markets.
Research exploring the association of inequality and educational marital sorting, however, is scant. Seminal international comparative analyses (Smits, Ultee, and Lammers 1998; Ultee and Luijkx 1990) have suggested but have not formally tested a potential association. A few papers have. Based on a comparison across 16 Latin American countries, Dahan and Gaviria (2001) found a relationship between educational assortative mating and inequality. Fernandez et al. (2005) carefully compared 34 countries and found evidence consistent with a reciprocal infl uence between economic inequality and assortative mating. However, both papers operationalized educational assortative mating as the correlation between spouses' years of schooling, a single overall measure that does not account for the varying strength of different barriers to intermarriage across countries. Furthermore, they measured inequality and marital sorting contemporaneously, but a more relevant determinant of intermarriage may be the lifetime economic gaps across educational groups at the time of marriage. 1 Instead of relying on an international comparison, Mare and Schwartz (2006) exploited temporal variation in intermarriage and earnings inequality between 1970 and 2000 in the United States and modeled the diffi culty of crossing barriers to intermarriage across specifi c educational groups. Their fi ndings indicated that the changing earnings gaps between educational groups account for a substantial portion of the trends in educational assortative mating. This study invites more research, examining the infl uence of economic inequality on the pattern of spousal educational resemblance. This is what I undertake in this article, by means of a comparative analysis of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. These three Latin American countries offer an interesting research site because their wide economic inequality is primarily rooted in returns to education (De Ferranti et al. 2004; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002) , and the economic gaps between educational categories substantially vary across countries (Duryea and Pages 2002) . This variation will be exploited in order to examine the relationship between inequality marital sorting across nations.
Another conspicuous characteristic of Latin American countries is the low levels of female labor force participation. While about 75% of U.S. women are engaged in paid employment, this percentage reaches only 52% in Brazil, 44% in Mexico, and 43% in Chile. 2 Low engagement in paid employment suggests that women's economic status is weakly correlated with their educational attainment, and that the patterns of educational marital sorting may be asymmetrical across gender. An alternative hypothesis, however, is one based on a broader defi nition of economic standing of women, which conceives of it as determined not only by monetary returns but also by assets such as her social connections, 1. Fernandez et al. (2005) created projections of lifetime income using contemporaneous observations on older cohorts to predict the future income of the young.
2. Figures are for the early 2000s and refer to the total population. cultural capital, and socialization skills. If these assets are correlated with women's educational attainment, educational marital sorting may be symmetrical across gender even if the type of resource controlled by men and women is different. Furthermore, if the earnings distribution across men's educational categories is correlated with the distribution of these assets across women's educational categories, male-specifi c earnings gaps may provide a better ranking for women's educational categories than female's earnings themselves. This hypothesis is tested in the analysis that follows. To date, very little is known about educational marital sorting in Latin America. The few studies on the topic considered a single country (Mexico [Esteve 2004 ] and Brazil [Silva 2003 ]), or city (Montevideo, Uruguay [Pullum and Peri 1999] , and Monterrey, Mexico [Solis, Pullum, and Bratter 2007] ). The only cross-national study in the region examined Mexico and Brazil but did not test for cross-country differences (Esteve and McCaa 2007) . None of them considered the potential association between marital sorting and socioeconomic inequality.
This article provides a systematic comparison of the location and strength of barriers to intermarriage in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico and evaluates the association between intermarriage barriers and economic distances across educational groups within each country. I proceed as follows: The next section describes the data and methods. Then, I offer a descriptive analysis of educational attainment and marital sorting in the countries analyzed. In the sections that follow, I present a comparative analysis of the main barriers to educational intermarriage across countries, explore the association between assortative mating and economic inequality within countries, and offer conclusions.
DATA AND METHODS

Data
Data for the analysis of educational assortative mating patterns come from random samples from national censuses, harmonized by the International Integrated Public Use Microdata project for Brazil (2000) , Chile (2002), and Mexico (2000) . 3 I select prevailing married and cohabiting couples. As it is known, prevailing unions may be subject to bias resulting from selective union dissolution, educational upgrading after marriage, and establishment of new unions (Schwartz and Mare 2005) ; this bias does not affect recently formed unions. I choose prevailing unions because it is the only type of comparable data available. Furthermore, if the objective is to provide an accurate description of the cross section of families, then prevailing unions are the appropriate unit of analysis.
To reduce the potential effect of selectivity and to ensure that most of the cohort that will eventually be in a union is observed as such, I select unions in which the male partner is 30-35 years of age. 4 I exclude couples in which the female is younger than 15 or older than 65, or if her age was unknown-less than 0.2% of couples in all countries.
This article follows the standard approach to assortative mating of focusing on spousal resemblance conditional on the existence of a union, excluding individuals who have never married or are currently not living with a partner. These individuals compose 25% of the selected age range in Brazil, 32.5% in Chile, and 19.8% in Mexico. This may induce selectivity determined by union formation and dissolution. A comprehensive model of assortative mating should consider the entire population at risk to marry and account for the selectivity into marriage and its relationship with the expected characteristics of potential partners (Mare and Schwartz 2006; Qian and Preston 1993) , a task that I leave for a future study. This analysis includes married and cohabiting couples, in contrast to most U.S.-based studies, which restrict the sample to marriages. Cohabitations are a substantial proportion of total unions in Latin America. According to census data, cohabitations compose 28.5% of unions in the selected age range in Brazil, 18.0% in Chile, and 18.6% in Mexico, compared with only 11.0% in the United States. Excluding these unions may result in substantial selectivity. The direction of such selectivity is not clear. Some research has found married couples to be more educationally homogamous than cohabitors (Blackwell and Lichter 2000; Jepsen and Jepsen 2002) , while others have found no signifi cant differences between union type (Blackwell and Lichter 2004; Qian 1998) , or even higher educational homogamy among cohabitors (Schoen and Winick 1993) . While all this research refers to the industrialized world, cohabitation is claimed to have a different status in Latin America. A historical tradition of common-law marriages, together with economic and legal restrictions to marriage and remarriage in some Latin American countries, is said to result in cohabitation having similar standing as marriage (Castro 2002; De Vos 1999) . The distinct status of cohabitation suggests that the patterns of marital sorting may not differ across union type in Latin America. I examined differences across married and cohabiting couples, confi rming this hypothesis. Cohabiting couples are slightly more likely to cross educational barriers in intermarriage, particularly in the two extremes of the educational distribution, but differences across union type are minor, and they do not alter results presented in this analysis (results available upon request).
Variables
A major challenge of international comparative analysis is to ensure the comparability of educational categories because of the substantial variation in the organization of educational systems. The challenge is manageable in Latin America because educational systems display low horizontal differentiation in terms of tracks or sectors with different curricula and differential access to higher levels of schooling. I distinguish six comparable levels of educational attainment: no education, primary schooling, some high school, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate. This classifi cation captures similar stages in the educational career even if they represent a different number of years across countries. International variation in the number of years is minimal: primary education involves 8 years of schooling in Brazil and Chile, and 6 years in Mexico; and high school graduation involves 11 years in Brazil, as opposed to 12 years in the other countries. The category "some college" comprises technical and vocational postsecondary education as well as incomplete university training, whereas the college graduate category is reserved for the attainment of a university degree.
Measures of lifetime earnings gaps across levels of education at the time of marriage are based on a series of repeated cross-sectional surveys for each country. For Brazil, I use the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domícilio PNAD (National Household Survey) years 1984, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1996, and 1998 . Chilean data are drawn from the Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica CASEN (Socioeconomic Characterization Survey) for 1987, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 . For Mexico, I use the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares ENIGH (Household Budget Survey) for 1984, 1989, 1994, 1996, and 1998. 5 I follow a strategy devised by Mare and Schwartz (2006) to scale educational categories based on their median earnings. My earnings measure includes income from all labor sources, including self-employment, which accounts for a substantial proportion of the 5. PNAD is conducted by the Brazilian National Bureau of the Census (IBGE). ENIGH is conducted by the Mexican National Statistics Agency (INEGI), and CASEN is conducted by the Chilean Ministry of Planning (MIDEPLAN). The three surveys are nationally representative and use a fully probabilistic, stratifi ed, multistage sampling design. labor force in Latin America (Portes and Hoffman 2003) . Specifi cally, I use the natural logarithm of monthly earnings for prime working-age (ages 25-64) adults in the approximate year of marriage/start of cohabitation. 6 This measure provides a proxy for lifetime earnings across educational categories, unaffected by the widely diverse age-earnings profi les across individuals with different levels of schooling.
Lifetime earnings are used as a synthetic indicator of the economic gaps across educational groups. However, earnings are not the only possible indicator of economic status. Alternative measures, such as income or occupational status, are regularly used in the study of inequality. I choose earnings for a combination of practical and substantive reasons. Earnings are the main determinant of economic well-being for most of the population, and they are strongly determined by educational attainment. In addition, earnings strongly correlate with other measures of economic advantage, and they capture variation in economic resources at the individual rather than the occupational or otherwise aggregate level. The main practical reason is that survey-based earnings information is more accurate than reports on other monetary indicators, such as income and wealth, in Latin America (Szekely and Hilgert 1999) .
I measure earnings gaps across educational groups at the time of marriage rather than contemporaneously. This strategy is intended to capture the incentives and constraints facing individuals at the time when they were at risk of establishing a union. This is particularly important if, as in the case of Latin America, earnings inequality varies substantially over time.
Given that information on year of marriage is not available in the national censuses, I construct an estimate of the approximate year of marriage for cells formed by the crossclassifi cation of husband's education, wife's education, and husband's age, and then assume that the couple was exposed to the education-specifi c earnings that prevailed that year. I use information about the age of the oldest child of the couple living at home to construct this estimate. I calculate the year in which the oldest child was born and subtract 1 to estimate the year of marriage, under the assumption that most Latin American couples will have their fi rst child soon after marrying (Heaton, Forste, and Otterstrom 2002) . Selection of relatively young couples in which the husband is aged 30-35 ensures that the large majority of oldest children still live in the parental home. For childless couples or otherwise missing cases, I impute the husband's age × husband's education × wife's education cell-specifi c estimated marriage year. (I also use an alternative strategy to estimate approximate year of marriage devised by Hajnal [1953] , which produces results substantively identical to those obtained by the "oldest child" method.)
Because earnings information is not available for each (approximate) year of marriage, if a particular year is unavailable, I impute the earnings of the closest available year. Finally, I produce an aggregate measure of median (ln)earnings for each educational category by calculating the weighted average of earnings across year of marriage, where the weights are the proportion of couples marrying each year. Because I am using earnings gaps between educational categories rather than absolute values, international and temporal variation in currency and infl ation are irrelevant in the calculation of educational earnings differences across years of marriage. 6. Given the low rates of female labor force participation in the countries considered, median female earnings are zero for several educational categories, which results in little discriminatory power of the wife's earnings measure. Therefore, in the case of wives, I restrict the calculation of median educational earnings to women engaged in paid employment (rather than obtaining it for all prime-age women), and weight these earnings values by the proportion of prime-age women engaged in paid employment in each educational level.
Methods
I analyze the three-way table cross-classifying husband's education (6 categories) by wife's education (6 categories) by country (3 categories), 7 using log-linear and log-multiplicative models. Log-linear models permit estimating associations between partners' characteristics while controlling for marginal distributions. The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. I fi rst pool the data for the three countries and compare a series of log-linear models in search of the best specifi cation to capture international variation in marital sorting. I mostly rely on crossing models, which can be written as follows:
The γ qk parameters represent the variation in the diffi culty of crossing educational barrier q in country k relative to the baseline country. Crossing models imply that educational intermarriage is a process of crossing barriers of different heights and that each barrier's height is determined by which educational categories it separates (Hout 1983; Johnson 1980; Mare 1991) . Crossing parameters capture the log-odds of crossing barriers across adjacent categories. The probability of crossing longer distances is obtained by summing the crossing parameters that separate the categories considered. For instance, a union between a husband with some high school and a college graduate wife involves crossing three adjacent educational barriers-those between some high school and high school graduate, high school graduate and some college, and some college and college graduate. By allowing the strength of these barriers to vary across countries, I account for international differences in the pattern, and not only overall level, of marital sorting. The second step investigates the association between the barriers to educational intermarriage and the earnings gaps between educational categories within each country, using two versions of scaled association models: the linear-by-linear interaction model, and the row-column II (RC) model (Goodman 1979; Haberman 1974) . The linear-by-linear interaction model scales husband's and wife's educational categories by means of a continuous attribute, and it expresses the association between these scale scores with a single parameter, similar to a regression coeffi cient. This approach was used by Hout (1982) and Kalmijn (1994) to examine occupational assortative mating. To account for the economic distances between educational categories, I scale them by their median earnings. This model is written as
where β is the association coeffi cient, and x i and y j are the earnings scores used to rank husband's and wife's educational categories. Two sets of earnings values are used: genderspecifi c scores, and male-specifi c scores for both husband and wife. The comparison between these two specifi cations addresses the hypothesis that the intermarriage distances for women are more accurately captured by male-specifi c earnings gaps than by genderspecifi c ones. As indicated, this hypothesis suggests that in a context of low female labor 7. For simplicity, I sometimes refer to "husband" and "wife" instead of "male partner" and "female partner," and to "marriages" instead of "unions." However, all analyses include married and cohabiting couples. force participation, male-specifi c earnings are a better proxy for the economic ranking of women's educational categories than female's earnings themselves because male-specifi c earnings identify other resources that women bring to the union.
The RC model, in turn, empirically estimates-rather than imposes-the scaling scores for partners' educational categories so as to produce the best-fi tting linear-by-linear association between them. The RC model is of the form
where φ i and ψ j are, respectively, the scaling scores of husband's and wife's educational categories. Empirically obtained from the data, these scores can be interpreted as optimal "assortative mating distances" between educational categories. I then compare the fi t and parameter estimates (scaling scores) between the linear-by-linear and RC models, under the following rationale: if assortative mating is entirely regulated by the earnings differences between educational groups, the fi t and parameter estimates would be identical between the two models. Differences between models will indicate that assortative mating barriers are not perfectly isomorphic with educational earnings gaps and will show the main sources of such departure. Model comparison relies mostly on the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistic, which permits selecting parsimonious models that provide an adequate fi t of the data (Raftery 1995) . To prevent the countries for which data sets are larger from exerting a dis proportionate infl uence on model selection, I standardized country tables to N = 5,000. Table 1 presents enrollment and completion rates for each educational level across countries for husbands (panel A) and wives (panel B). U.S. fi gures based on the 2000 census are added in the last row as baseline for comparison. The table reveals substantial differences in educational attainment across countries. Access to primary school is nearly universal in the three countries considered, but cross-country differences emerge in the access to high school. Three-quarters and two-thirds of adults have some secondary education in Chile and Mexico, respectively. This fi gure reaches only about one-third in Brazil. The international differences magnify at the postsecondary level, with about 25% of Chileans, but only 15% of Mexicans and 10% of Brazilians, reaching college. This contrasts with about 60% of U.S. respondents who attain some postsecondary education. Gender differences are small in all countries. In Chile and Mexico, males have a small advantage, especially at the postsecondary level. Brazil presents an interesting contrast, with females attaining more schooling than their male counterparts, a gender asymmetry that has been documented by other research (e.g., Silva 2003:367) .
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND EDUCATIONAL ASSORTATIVE MATING: RATES ACROSS COUNTRIES
Before I present an analysis of the association between spousal educational attainments, some descriptive information on observed rates of educational inter marriage is necessary. Table 2 shows the proportion of couples that are homogamous-that is, in which both partners have the same level of education-as well as the proportion of couples crossing various numbers of educational barriers. The proportion of unions that are homogamous reaches 60% in Brazil, 48% in Chile, and 50% in Mexico. These substantial proportions are not a Latin American anomaly, as indicated by the 52% of couples that are homogamous in the United States. The percentage of unions that cross up to one educational barrier-for instance, when one partner has some college and the other has a college degree-is 81% in Brazil, 84% in Chile, and 86% in Mexico compared with 88% in the United States. Furthermore, the proportion of couples that cross all fi ve educational barriers-that is, when one partner has no education and the other is a college graduate-is a negligible 0.03% in Brazil, 0.003% in Chile, and 0.02% in Mexico, compared with 0.05% in the United States. Educational homogamy appears to be the rule in these countries, and intermarriage crossing more than one educational category is very unusual.
These descriptive measures, however, are not conclusive. International variation in observed proportions in different categories of the joint distribution of partners' education is the outcome of two forces: variation in the marginal distributions, and variation in the association between partners' educational attainment, net of marginal distributions. Two examples illustrate this point. First, the proportion of marriages involving individuals with no education is particularly low in Chile partly because very few Chileans have no schooling. Second, Mexico displays the largest educational gender gap favoring men. Not surprisingly, 45% of college-graduate Mexican men marry a college-graduate spouse, but 64% of Mexican women with a college degree do so (not shown), an asymmetry that emerges partly from the excess of men with college degrees. To explore the association between husband's and wife's education controlling for the marginal distribution of educational attainment, I turn to a log-linear analysis. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PATTERN OF ASSORTATIVE MATING IN LATIN AMERICA
To explore the relative strength of barriers to educational intermarriage, I estimate a series of log-linear models that account for different patterns of association across nations. Fit statistics are reported in Table 3 , and parameter estimates of the preferred model are presented in Table 4 . Model 1 allows for unrestricted association between partners' education, but it constrains it to be constant across countries. Model 2 replaces unrestricted association with a more parsimonious, symmetrical formulation. While the unrestricted model uses (i -1) × (j -1) parameters, the model assuming symmetrical association across the main diagonal uses only ([i -1] × [ j -2]) / 2 terms, and it fi ts signifi cantly better according to the BIC statistic.
The good fi t of Model 2 indicates that symmetric association is enough to capture a country-invariant pattern of educational assortative mating. Some research suggests that husbands display a uniform tendency to marry down with respect to education, net of the disparate distribution of educational attainment across genders (e.g., Mare 1991) . Thus, Model 3 adds a uniform hypergamy/hypogamy parameter. 8 Model 3 does not improve the fi t over the symmetry model (L 2 M3 -L 2 M2 = 4.4 (1), p = .11, BIC M3 -BIC M2 = 2.1). Therefore, a gender-symmetric model suffi ces to describe the pattern of association that is common across countries.
Models 4-6 relax the constraint that educational assortative mating is invariant across countries and test different specifi cations of international variation. Given the well-known propensity of individuals to marry within the same educational category, Model 4 adds a diagonal parameter (D) capturing this propensity, and it allows this diagonal parameter to vary across countries. Model 5 posits that tendency to marry homogamously varies across educational categories, thus adding one homogamy parameter for each diagonal cell (H), allowing these parameters to vary across countries. Finally, Model 6 captures international variation with country-specifi c crossing parameters. This model fi ts best among those compared. Its good fi t indicates that international variation in intermarriage is adequately captured by the diffi culty of crossing different barriers to intermarriage. Models 7, 8, and 9 augment the crossing formulation (Model 6) with country-specifi c diagonal, homogamy, and female hypergamy parameters, respectively. None of them substantially improve the fi t according to BIC. As a fi nal test, Model 10 eliminates the baseline symmetric association and captures intermarriage propensities solely by country-specifi c crossing parameters. This excessively parsimonious model results in a signifi cant decline in fi t. The preferred model is therefore Model 6. Even if it does not fi t the data by conventional statistical criteria (p = .001), the fi t is very good given the large sample size, and it explains 99% of the association under independence.
The preferred model indicates that the pattern of educational assortative mating varies across countries, and that differential ability of couples to cross educational barriers is suffi cient to account for international variation. Furthermore, both the country-invariant and the country-specifi c portions of the association are symmetric with respect to gender, as indicated by the symmetric structure of the baseline association and the crossing parameters and by the superfl uousness of the female hypergamy/hypogamy terms. In other words, the odds of crossing an educational barrier in intermarriage are the same regardless of whether it is the husband or the wife who has higher educational attainment. 8. Given that symmetry parameters are included, female hypergamy and hypogamy parameters are of equal magnitude and opposite sign. (6); F = female partner's education (6); N = nation (3), S = symmetry (15); Hy = hypergamy/hypogamy (1); C = crossing (5); D = diagonal (1); and H = homogamy (6). Table 4 presents the country-specifi c crossing parameters obtained from Model 6. 9 Column 1 presents the log-odds of marrying across adjacent educational categories (b) and column 2 displays the corresponding odds (exp[b]). Column 3 indicates, for each particular country, whether the crossing parameter is signifi cantly different from that of other countries at p < .05. For example, in the last row of the table, column 3 indicates that the odds of intermarriage between a college-graduate spouse and a spouse with less than a college degree are signifi cantly lower in Chile than in Mexico or Brazil.
The odds of crossing each barrier obtained from the preferred model are displayed in Figure 1 . As expected, the odds of crossing all educational barriers are less than unity, indicating that it is less likely to intermarry than to marry homogamously. Figure 1 shows that there is substantial variation in the pattern of educational assortative mating across countries. Chile's "excess assortative mating" is driven by the strength of the barriers at the upper end of the educational distribution-those separating the college educated, and particularly college graduates, from persons with less education. This pattern combines with weak barriers to intermarriage in the lower end of the distribution, particularly with the barrier separating those with a high school diploma or more from those with less education.
Mexico displays a pattern opposite that of Chile. In Mexico, the barriers to intermarriage between the college educated and the rest of society are relatively weak, but crossing barriers at the lower end of the educational distribution is more diffi cult. The barrier separating Mexicans with only primary schooling from those with at least some high school is particularly strong. The Brazilian pattern of intermarriage is located in between these two extremes, with relatively homogeneous intermarriage distances across educational levels. 9. Because a baseline symmetric association accounting for the country-invariant component of educational assortative mating is included, the model does not produce interpretable coeffi cients for the odds of crossing each educational barrier for the country used as baseline for comparison (Brazil, in this case). The model does produce, however, interpretable coeffi cients for the cross-country difference in the odds of crossing each educational barrier, which is the focus of this analysis. Indicates the countries for which crossing parameter is signifi cantly diff erent from the one being reported, at p <.05.
In sum, this comparative analysis shows that Latin American countries have very distinct patterns of assortative mating. Chile is defi ned by strong barriers at the upper end of the educational distribution, whereas barriers are stronger between the lower and middle educational echelons in Mexico. Brazil features more uniform barriers across the educational hierarchy. The substantial variation in the intermarriage patterns across countries raises a question about the relationship between the pattern of educational assortative mating and the pattern of inequality within each country, to which I now turn.
TESTING THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ASSORTATIVE MATING AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
I now explore the hypothesis that within countries, the strength of the barriers to intermarriage is related to the economic distance between educational categories. Figure 2 displays the median male ln(earnings) at the approximate year of marriage across educational groups in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. To facilitate comparison, median earnings of the "no schooling" educational category are coded as 0 (zero) in each country. This strategy normalizes the location but not the scale of the earnings distributions, thus providing information about the magnitude of the earnings gaps across countries. Figure 2 reveals substantial cross-country variation in median earnings across educational groups. Brazil displays the widest earnings gap, which is consistent with the somewhat higher degree of economic disparities that characterizes this country (De Ferranti In Mexico, earnings differences are more pronounced at the lower end of the educational distribution, whereas they are wider at the upper end in Chile. The educational earnings gaps across countries appear to correlate with the strength of educational barriers examined in the previous section, providing an empirical basis for the hypothesis of an association between educational earnings gaps and marital sorting. I now formally test such isomorphism by comparing scaled association models separately for each country. Model 1 in Table 5 assumes no association between husband's and wife's educational attainment and is used as the baseline for comparison. Model 2 is the RC model, which produces the best "assortative mating distances" between educational categories. Although the RC model does not fi t the data by conventional standards (p < .001 in all countries), it accounts for 97% of the association under independence in Brazil and Mexico, and 93% in Chile. The good fi t of the model indicates that a single unidimensional scaling is suffi cient to account for the intermarriage distances across educational groups within each nation. Before comparing these intermarriage distances with the educational earnings gaps, I test the hypothesis that they are symmetrical across genders. Model 3 constrains the scores produced by the RC model to be equal for husbands and wives. This model is strongly preferred on the basis of BIC in all countries and is not signifi cantly worse in terms of the deviance statistic in any of them (p =.64 in Brazil, p = .18 in Chile, and p = .84 in Mexico). As the crossing model, this specifi cation indicates that educational intermarriage distances are symmetrical across genders.
Odds of Crossing Each Educational Barrier
I now move to the main question of the analysis: are intermarriage distances isomorphic with earnings gaps in each country? I rank educational categories by their median earnings and fi t a linear-by-linear interaction model. As indicated, two sets of earnings scores are compared. Model 4 scales husbands' and wives' educational categories according to gender-specifi c median earnings, and Model 5 uses male-specifi c earnings scores. Model 5 fi ts much better than Model 4 in Brazil and Chile, and not substantially worse in the case of Mexico (BIC difference = -3.3). This result is consistent with the hypothesis that, in a context of low female labor force participation, male-specifi c earnings are a better proxy for the "intermarriage distances" of women with different levels of schooling than female-specifi c earnings themselves. I then compare Model 5, which ranks educational categories based on their malespecifi c median earnings, with the RC model, which provides optimal intermarriage distances across educational groups. If the fi t for Model 5 is as good as the fi t of the RC model, I would conclude that earnings gaps between educational groups fully account for patterns of intermarriage. The evidence rejects this hypothesis. Model 5 is worse than the RC models in all countries, suggesting that educational assortative mating distances are not identical to earning gaps between educational groups.
Identical fi t may be, nonetheless, an excessively stringent test. Given that the RC formulation produces optimal intermarriage distances, identical fi t of a model that ranks educational categories by their earnings would signal a deterministic condition in which economic inequality fully accounts for "who marries whom." This suggests that the RC model should be used not as an empirically attainable outcome but as a useful benchmark for comparison. I can gauge the performance of the model using earnings scores by examining the percentage of the association explained by the RC model that is accounted for by earnings differences. This percent reaches 97% in Brazil (94.6% / 97.1%), 96.1% in Chile, and 95.7% in Mexico. These large proportions suggest that earnings gaps across educational categories account for most of the intermarriage distances between them. 10 10. However, any hierarchical ranking of educational groups would account for a substantial portion of the intermarriage distances between them. For example, the uniform association model assuming equally spaced integer Two further strategies are used to explore the isomorphism between educational assortative mating and economic inequality. The fi rst strategy imputes to each country the educational earnings distances of the other two countries, and reestimates linear-by-linear distances across educational categories accounts for 94.6% of the association explained by the RC model in Brazil, 92.5% in Chile, and 90.2% in Mexico, as reported in Model 6 of Table 5 . models (Models 7 and 8). For example, in the case of Brazil, I impute the earnings gaps for Chile (Model 7) and Mexico (Model 8). If the pattern of earnings inequality substantially varies across nations, and if educational assortative mating is responsive to the countryspecifi c earnings gaps between educational categories, I should expect Models 7 and 8 fi t signifi cantly worse than Model 5 in all countries. This is indeed what is found. In every case, the models imputing the earnings gaps of other countries are signifi cantly worse than the model using the country-specifi c educational earnings gaps.
The second strategy is to graphically compare the earnings distances between educational groups with the "optimal assortative mating distances" obtained from the RC model. Figure 3 presents such both sets of scores for each country, normalized so that Σ(scores) = 0 and Σ(scores 2 ) = 1. 11 Figure 3 highlights the very high degree of isomorphism between earnings distances and "intermarriage distances" among educational categories, and confi rms the sharp differences in the pattern of these distributive phenomena across nations. In Chile, the strong barrier to intermarriage separating the college-educated-and specifi cally, college graduates-closely matches the substantial earnings advantage of this group; the more fl uid intermarriage in the lower end of the educational distribution (between those with high school or less education) corresponds to the much-reduced earnings gaps between these categories. In Mexico, in contrast, intermarriage distances at the bottom of the educational distribution match the wider economic differences associated with attaining primary and high school education. Brazil, in turn, displays a more linear gradient of intermarriage distances, which closely resembles the earnings gaps between educational groups in this country.
Taken together, these fi ndings suggest that intermarriage distances across educational groups are strongly correlated with the earnings gaps between these educational groups, which I interpret as evidence of association between economic inequality and educational marital sorting. However, I have not tested this hypothesis against any alternative account for such isomorphism. One hypothesis emerges as plausible. School enrollment has a substantial marriage-delaying effect (Lloyd ed. 2005; Thornton, Axinn, and Teachman 1995) . This endogenous feature (individuals delay union formation to complete schooling) may result in constraints in the marriage market experienced by different educational groups. If, for instance, most college graduates marry in their late 20s but high school dropouts marry in their late teens and early 20s, this factor will affect the age distribution of the available pool of potential partners for individuals with different levels of schooling and therefore will impose constraints for educational intermarriage.
To the extent that age distances are collinear with educational earnings gaps between educational groups, the observed isomorphism between intermarriage and inequality may be a by-product of this life-cycle constraint. If age distances are driving the observed isomorphism, two outcomes should be observed: (1) a linear-by-linear model ranking educational groups based on age at marriage should fi t better than models utilizing earnings to rank educational groups; and (2) the age of marriage distances across educational categories should be closely isomorphic to their intermarriage distances. Models 9 and 10 test for the fi rst implication, using the estimated median age of marriage to rank educational group. Given the gender gap in age of marriage whereby women tend to marry younger than men, two versions of age at marriage are tested. Model 9 imposes male-specifi c age at marriage on husbands and wives, whereas Model 10 uses gender-specifi c scores. Both models fi t substantially worse than Model 5, based on earnings gaps, in all countries. Furthermore, the scaling scores for educational groups based on age at marriage substantially depart from optimal intermarriage distances, as reported in Figure 4 . On this evidence, I reject the Sources: Optimal educational assortative mating distances for each country are obtained from Model 3, Table 5 . Earnings gaps are male-specifi c lifetime median earnings diff erences across educational groups at the approximate time of marriage. See the text for details. 
Normalized Coefficients/Median Earnings
Normalized Coefficients/Median Earnings hypothesis that the isomorphism between intermarriage distances and educational earnings gaps within each country is a by-product of the international variation in age at marriage across educational levels.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This article examines the important but scarcely studied relationship between economic inequality and educational marital sorting through a comparative analysis of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The fi ndings indicate substantial international variation in the strength of barriers to intermarriage: that is, in the pattern, rather than just the overall level, of assortative mating. They question comparative analyses of marital sorting that rely on a single overall measure of spousal educational resemblance. For example, if I had based the comparative analysis on the correlation coeffi cient of husband's and wife's years of schooling, I would have found the same level of marital sorting in Mexico and Brazil (r = .67) and a somewhat lower level in Chile (r = .61). These fi gures would have ignored highly consequential sources of variation across countries. While Brazil features relatively uniform barriers to intermarriage across adjacent educational groups, Chile and Mexico display opposing patterns of marital sorting. Chile features very strong barriers at the top of the educational distribution, combined with more fl uid intermarriage at the lower end, and the opposite pattern is found in Mexico. In terms of the main questions of this analysis, I fi nd that the barriers to intermarriage across educational groups are highly isomorphic to the earnings gaps between these educational groups in each country, and that international variation in marital sorting closely follows differences in earnings gaps across countries. This fi nding supports the hypothesis that economic inequality reduces the economic incentives and widens the cultural and spatial distances that prevent interaction and romance between individuals with different levels of education. Furthermore, to the extent that spousal educational resemblance results in stronger intergenerational association by widening the gaps in the family resources of the next generation (Fernandez and Rogerson 2001; Kremer 1997; Mare 2000) , this fi nding suggests that current economic disparities rooted in educational attainment will contribute to the intergenerational reproduction of economic inequality.
This fi nding adds to a growing literature considering the pattern, as opposed to the aggregate level, of stratifi cation phenomena such as economic inequality, inter generational mobility, or marital sorting. For example, recent research indicates that the surge in earnings inequality in advanced industrial countries is largely driven by dispersion at the top of the distribution, with little change elsewhere (Atkinson 2007; Saez 2005) . By the same token, international differences in intergenerational mobility have been found to be largely driven by differences in the lower and upper ends of the distribution-that is, by crosscountry variation in reproduction of poverty and wealth (Bratsberg et al. 2007; Jantti et al. 2006 ). This article contributes to this literature by suggesting that consideration of the pattern, and not only aggregate level, of inequality and marital sorting could enlighten not only changes in their univariate distribution over time or across countries, but also the association between them.
Another remarkable fi nding is that the barriers to educational intermarriage are symmetrical across genders, in spite of the likely different types of resources that men and women bring to the union. Given the low rates of female labor force participation in Latin America, women's position in the marriage market may more crucially depend on resources such as their socialization skills, cultural capital, or access to social networks rather than on women's own earnings. The dual fi nding of gender-symmetric patterns of intermarriage, and of a close isomorphism between these patterns and male-specifi c earnings gaps, suggests that educational intermarriage is regulated by a latent variable that can be broadly defi ned as socioeconomic advantage, which expresses itself in different, gender-specifi c assets. Furthermore, it suggests that male-specifi c earnings are an accurate proxy for this latent construct not only for husbands but also for wives. Future research exploring specifi c resources that both partners bring to the union, and the ranking of educational categories based on these resources, would shed further light on the processes leading to marital sorting.
This study has made a series of analytical decisions that require examination by future work. First, I focus on three nations rather than conducting a larger multicountry analysis to provide a detailed assessment of the pattern, rather than only the overall level, of assortative mating. Research considering a larger number of nations and ensuring comparability would provide more degrees of freedom to test variation. Second, because of data constraints, I use estimated earnings rather than actual earnings at time of marriage, something that may be overcome as information on marital histories becomes available in surveys. Furthermore, by using median earnings to scale educational categories, I ignore variance within educational groups and combine the effect of variation in labor supply with variation in wage rates. This set of decisions about how to measure the relationship between inequality and assortative mating may affect the empirical fi ndings and emphasize the need for more research that broadens the comparative enterprise. Finally, the fi ndings are eminently descriptive, and I am not in a position to assert the causal effect of inequality on marital sorting or to evaluate the net infl uence of different dimensions of inequality-economic incentives, cultural gaps, and the stratifi ed organization of marriage markets-on intermarriage patterns. I trust that future analyses of large-scale data sets based on well-specifi ed behavioral models, combined with qualitative insights on individual preferences and structural constraints, will further contribute to the understanding of mechanisms driving the association between inequality and educational intermarriage.
